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supply companies. The Authority alleged violations of
the CFA and sought costs for the replacement or repair
of defective roofing materials.
The trial court reasoned that if the legislature
had intended to include organizations in the CFA's
definition of "person," then it would have specifically
listed organizations, such as the Authority, in the statute.
Since the CFA listed neither "organization" nor the
Authority in its definition of "person," the trial court
dismissed the Authority's claims. The Authority appealed.

Expansive statutory language and remedial
purpose reveal legislature's intention
On appeal, the Authority argued that the CFA's
language demonstrates the legislature's intention that the
term "person" should be liberally construed. In addition,
the Authority asserted that controlling law dictates an
expansive reading of the CFA. The appellate court began
its analysis by examining the language of 56:8-1(d),
which states:
The term "person" as used in this act shall
include any natural person or his legal representative, partnership, corporation, company, trust,
business entity or association, and any agent,
employee, salesman, partner, officer, director,
member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestuis
que trustent thereof ....

Applying principles of statutory construction, the
court observed that "includes" is generally a term of
expansion rather than limitation. Thus, the court noted
that "includes" suggests other items may be includable
even though they are not delineated.
In addition, the court commented that the
Authority shares characteristics with entities, such as
corporations, that are specifically listed in the CFA's
definition of "person." For example, the court explained
that the Authority can make and execute contracts,
borrow money, and acquire real or personal property,
much as a "corporation," "company," "business entity,"
or "association" does.
Furthermore, the court examined the objective
of the CFA, which is "to discourage unlawful sales and
advertising practices designed to induce consumers to
purchase merchandise." Emphasizing the CFA's goal of
consumer protection, the court again turned to statutory
interpretation. The court recognized that "consumer" is
typically defined as "one who uses (economic) goods,
and so diminishes or destroys their utilities." Applying
this definition, the court found that the Authority is
undoubtedly a consumer, since it purchases goods with
public funds to benefit certain segments of the populace.
The court also concluded that the CFA, as remedial
legislation, requires an expansive construction in favor
of consumer protection. Accordingly, the court held that
the term "person," as defined by the CFA, includes a
public authority acting as a consumer; therefore, a public
authority may prosecute a consumer fraud claim.

Salesman's deceptive statements constitute an
unfair trade practice
by Dana Shannon

In Torrance v. AS & L
Motors, Ltd., 459 S.E.2d 67 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1995), the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that an
automobile salesman's deceptive
comments concerning the condition
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of a used car constituted an unfair
trade practice. In addition, the court
determined that the parol evidence
rule did not bar evidence of the
salesman's misleading statements,
which occurred prior to the

plaintiff's execution of an "as is-no
warranty" agreement. Although the
court affirmed the trial court by
allowing the salesman's statements
as evidence and by finding an unfair
trade practice, the court reversed an
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award of attorneys' fees to the
plaintiff.

Buyer expressly agrees to
purchase without warranty
after salesman claims
vehicle never "wrecked"
In June 1992, Antoinette
Torrance ("Torrance") purchased a
1989 BMW automobile from AS &
L Motors ("AS & L") for $13,181.
As part of the purchase agreement,
Torrance signed a statement acknowledging that the vehicle came
without a warranty, in "as is"
condition. The agreement included a
provision that "[tihe dealer assumes
no responsibility for any repairs
regardless of any oral statements
about the vehicle." Nonetheless,
before executing the agreement,
Torrance asked AS & L's sales
manager whether the car had ever
been in an accident. According to
Torrance, the sales manager indicated that the car had never been
"wrecked" and that it was in "good
condition."
Three weeks later, Torrance
detected red paint on the car's
windshield. Thereafter, she consulted an auto body repairman who
discovered considerable damage on
the vehicle's right side. The estimated cost of repair was $2,500.
Upon returning to AS & L and
demanding a refund or replacement,
Torrance met resistance. She then
sued, alleging that AS & L engaged
in fraudulent misrepresentation and
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unfair and deceptive trade practices
in violation of Chapter 75 of the
North Carolina General Statutes
("Statute").
After a bench trial, the
court found that the salesman's
comments constituted an unfair and
deceptive trade practice under the
Statute. Although the court determined that AS & L did not commit
fraud, it concluded that the statements were material to the parties'
transaction and that they misled the
buyer into purchasing the car. The
trial court awarded Torrance $2,500
in damages, which, pursuant to the
statute, it trebled to $7,500. In
addition, the court awarded Torrance
$4,750 in attorneys' fees. AS & L
appealed.

Actual proof of deception is
not required
On appeal, AS & L first
asserted that the trial court erred in
admitting parol evidence of the
salesman's statements made prior to
Torrance's signing of the "as is"
agreement. The court stated that the
parol evidence rule bars statements
offered to "vary, add to, or contradict" a written contract's terms.
However, the trial court admitted the
salesman's statements to prove an
unfair or deceptive trade practice,
not to contradict the contractual
terms. Therefore, the court of
appeals concluded that the parol
evidence rule does not preclude
admission of such statements,

thereby affirming the trial court's
determination of this issue.
Next, AS & L argued that
the trial court erred in holding that
the salesman's statements constituted an unfair and deceptive
practice. In its analysis, the court
followed Marshallv. Miller, 276
S.E.2d 397 (N.C. 1981), where the
court stated that "a practice is
deceptive if it has the capacity or
tendency to deceive; proof of actual
deception is not required" under the
statute. Thus, the court stated that a
prevailing plaintiff need only show
that the defendant's statements had a
"capacity or tendency to deceive"
and that the plaintiff suffered harm
as a proximate result of those
statements. The court noted that
competent evidence supported the
trial court's findings that the
statements were material and did
mislead the plaintiff. Accordingly,
the court affirmed, holding that the
salesman's misleading statements
constituted an unfair trade practice.
Finally, AS & L argued that
the trial court erroneously awarded
attorneys' fees to Torrance. The
court stated that a trial court may
award attorneys' fees under the
statute if: 1) the plaintiff prevails; 2)
the defendant willfully participated
in a deceptive practice or act; and 3)
the defendant unjustifiably refused
to fully resolve the issue. Since the
trial court failed to make these
requisite findings, the court reversed
and remanded on the issue of
attorneys' fees.
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